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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
But the federal reserve banks cannot pay exchange. This precludes par collection through the mails in the case of certain state banks. The only alternative,
if the above argument is valid, is presentation at the counter with insistence upon
all technical rights usually accorded the holders of checks, particularly the right to
demand payment in cash. To set aside such action arbitrarily as being "coercion"
is to overlook the right of the holder of any ordinary check to demand payment
at the bank in cash, a right which, though purely technical in the case at issue,
certainly serves to offset the equally technical and much insisted upon right of state
banks to charge exchange on remittances through the mail. But what is of vastly
greater importance is the imperious necessity of such action in the interest of the
economic operation of the banking machinery which the Federal Reserve Act
brought into existence.
Such laws as the states have passed or are likely to pass can but befog the
issue. The right of the state banks to remit in the form of exchange drafts is
not in issue. It has never been questioned by the federal reserve banks. It was
dragged into court purely because of its arbitrary coupling with the exchange.
Exchange drafts have not been refused by the federal reserve banks except when
they called for amounts less than the face value of the checks collected.
Acts of certain federal reserve banks in accumulating checks before their
presentation, and in resorting to methods which in and of themselves were annoying and injurious to the non-member banks and unnecessary to the successful
achievement of par clearance, are to be classed merely as unfortunate incidents
with no permanent bearing whatsoever on the problem at large.
Regardless of the disposition which may be made of pending par clearance
cases by the United States Supreme Court, the eventual establishment of par
clearance is inevitable. Par clearance long since became an actuality in the more
important clearing centres of the country. Its appearance is a normal incident of
growth in banking efficiency, trade volume, use of credit, and population density,
together with safe and rapid communication and transportation facilities. Universal recognition of it will achieve for the country far more than is indicated by
the claim of an annual $135,000,000 saving. Its real service will be the incomparably greater rapidity, economy, safety, and ease with which transfers of capital
and settlements of trade and financial balances may be effected throughout the
business world generally.
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IN THE recent case of Door Co. v. Joyner,' the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated the doctrine of title by estoppel to be that a subsequently acquired title
2 (1921) 182 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259.
Cf. 1 N. C. L. Rev. 56. See also the statement of the
principle (quoted from 16 Cyc. 689) in Baker v. Austin (1907) 174 N. C. 433, 93 S. E. 949.
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inures to make good a former deed of the grantor made at a time when such
grantor had no title. "Whether," observes the court, "this mode of acquiring title
shall be regarded as a conveyance taking effect as of the date of the former deed,
or as an equitable principle made available under common law forms, is not a settled proposition." In other words, there are two theories as to title by estoppel.
One is that the after-acquired title inures by operation of law to the grantee, with
the same effect as if the grantor had had and conveyed it at the time of the original
conveyance. The other is that when the grantor with no title or with defective
title by his deed assumes to convey a title or interest to the grantee, and subsequently acquires such interest, the grantee has an equity to compel the conveyance
of such after-acquired interest to himself. 2 Moreover, a court of law will recognize and administer this equity and, considering, in accordance with the equitable
maxim, that as done which ought to be done, will regard the title as in the grantee,
subject to the usual equitable exception as to the rights of a purchaser for value
and without notice.3 The case is strictly parallel to the state of things which
exists, where courts of law recognize and enforce equitable assignments of future
4
contingent interests in property, as well as mere legal grants.
Under the first theory, that after-acquired title passes by operation of law as
if conveyed in the original deed, the effect of the transfer of title is the same as
the old rebutter of warranty, and, as our courts have paid much attention to the
distinction between rebutter and estoppel, it will be necessary to examine the doctrine of rebutter and see to what extent it has been recognized as subsisting in this
state.
Rebutter grew out of the old feudal warranty which was an incident of the
tenure subsisting when the feudal lord granted a fief to his vassal, and which
bound the lord to replace the lands if the tenant was deprived of them. 5 The
statute quia emnptores (A. D. 1290) put an end to such tenures in conveyances in
fee and thus to the warranty implied from them,6 but the express clause of warranty which had long been in use in charters of feoffment 7 preserved many of the
characteristics of feudal warranty. Thus it was a true covenant real, the breach
of which the grantor made good by giving the grantee another res or estate of
equal value, and not by damages.8 The active obligation to make recompense in
2 Chew v. Barnet (Pa. 1824) 11 S. & R. 389.

See also cases on mortgages of after-acquired property:

while, at common law, nothing which is not in esse and the property of the mortgagor, can be mortgaged,

equity will give effect to a contract to convey future-acquired property whether real or personal, for equity
regards as done that which ought to be done, and treats the mortgage as already attaching to the newly
acquired property as it comes into thle mortgagor's hands. Lumer Co. v. Lumber Co. (1909) 150 N. C.
282, 286, 63 5. E• 1045; Godv.n v. Bank (1907) 145 N. C. 320, 328, 59 5. E. 154.
SSee Door Co. V..Joyner, note 1, s pra; and the cases cited in the last note, as to mortgage of future-

acquired property. Especially would this course seem proper under our judicial system, where equitable
titles
defenses
be asserted
in actions
law.482,.is.
Lumber Co. (1915) 170 N. C. 273, 277,
87
5. and
E• 40;
Levin may
v. Glodstein
(1906)
142 N.at C.
55 5.Co.E.v.371.
"Mstin
v. Marlow (1871) 65 N. C. 696, 703; Kornegav v. Miller (1905) 137 N. C. 659, 50 S. E.
315; Hobgood v. Hobgood (1915)

169 N.

C. 485, 86'S. E. 189; Williams v. Biggs (1918)176

N.

C. 48,

96 S. E. 643; Bourne v. Farrar (1920) 180 N. C. 135, 104 S. E. 170.
5 Cover v. McAden (1922) 183 N. C. 641, 112 S. E. 817; Jenks, Short History of English Law, 109
et seq.

Butler's note, no. 315, to Co. Litt.

e Butler's note, ubi supra; Rickets v. Dickens (1810) 5 N. C. 342, 346.
Clauses of warranty became a normal part of charters of feoffment about the year 1200. 2 Pollock
and Maitland, History of English Laic, 311; 3 Holdsworth, History of English Lau-, 93.
s Co. Litt. 384b; 3 BI. Coin. 156. Rawle, Covenants, 3rd ed., 209. In Gilliam v. Jacocks (1826) 11 N. C.
310, Taylor, C. J., bases his holding on the ground that in a bargain and sale a warranty is not a covenant real but a mere personal covenant. See also S. C. (1819) 7 N. C. 47, where he says, p. 54; "There
is no authority to superadd to a covenant which is clearly personal, the remedy by rebutter, which belongs
to that real covenant which is called a warranty." The modern "covenant of warranty" shouId be carefully
distinguished from old "warranty." In the modern sense a covenant real is one that is annexed or incident to the estate conveyed by the deec and runs with it, etc. (a covenant which runs with the land).
Wiggins v. Pender (1903) 132 N. C. 628, 638, 44 S. E. 362. This change in the meaning of "real covenant" has been a large cause of confusion.
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other land could only be inforced in the old real actions by the common law process of voucher to warranty or by warrantiacartae,9 but the passive effect of a
warranty as rebutter was wider and was available in personal actions such as
ejectment, being originally given to avoid circuity of action. 10 The usefulness of
rebutter, however, as a protection to title, was further hampered by its origin. It
could not extend farther than the warranty of which it was an incident, and warranty in its old sense could be attached only to conveyances effective through livery
of seizin, which had a "tortious operation," like feoffment. 11 It did not attach to
the "innocent or rightful conveyances" which became the common assurances of
title after the statute of uses. 12 So, when the young and vigorous action of ejectment superseded the old real actions as a method of trying title, the active benefits
of warranty were swept away with the real actions through which they were available, and its passive protection to title, through rebutter, became available only in
forms of conveyance such as feoffment, fast disappearing from use. English conveyancers therefore devised the familiar "covenants for title" and omitted the
clause of general warranty in their conveyances. 13 In America a different course
was pursued; we retained the old warranty in form, even in deeds of bargain and
sale, but interpreted it in its active operation as a mere personal covenant, equivalent to the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 14 How to treat it in its passive operation
as rebutter has been a troublesome question, to which we shall return later in
this paper.
Before considering the North Carolina cases alluded to above on rebutter and
estoppel, it may be helpful to summarize briefly the characteristics of rebutter,
contrasting it so far as possible in each case with estoppel. It may be premised
that all the qualities of rebutter of warranty are logical results of the common law
transfer of title by livery of seizin with its tortious operation.
1. Rebutter is annexed only to warranty and cannot exist without warranty; while
estoppel is independent of warranty and may exist where there is no warranty."
2. Rebutter operates on "the right to the estate" or upon the estate itself ; estoppel "operates entirely as to facts," arising wholly "out of affirmations of matters of fact contained in
the deed.""
9 3 BI. Com. 300; 2 Th. Coke, 245, note a; Jenks, Short History, 110; Rickets v. Dickens, eupra
note 6.
10Jenks, Short History, 111; Co. Litt. 265a. Coke says that "rebutter' is a kind of estoppel" Co
Litt. 352a. A plea in rebutter was in form a plea in estoppel, Sheppard's Touchstone, Preston's ed. 182,
where the form of plea is given. See also, Bigelow, Estoppel, 6th ed. 422.
itSee infra, note 20.
1See infra, note 21.
"3The invention of covenants for title is ascribed to Sir Orlando Bridgemn in the time of the com.
nionwealth Rawle on Covenants, 3rd ed., 11. "The clause of warranty [in England] has long been dis.
used1 1in modern conveyancing." Williams, Real Property, 17th ed., 649.
Rickets v. Dickens 11810) 5 N. C. 343, sustaining the action of covenant on warranty in a bargain
and sale deed. Spruill v. Leary (1852) 35 N. C. 408, per Pearson J.3"After the action of ejectment
superseded real actions, as in ejectment there could be no voucher, the courts construed a warranty to be
a covenant for quiet enjoyment, and gave an action for damages in case of eviction." Souherland v.
Stout (1873) 68 N. C. 446, 449.
"1Taylor v. Shufford (1825) 11 N. C. 116, 15 Am. D. 512; Weeks v. Wilkins (1905) 139 N. C. 215,
51 S. E.'909; Olds v. Cedar Works (1917) 173 N. C. 161, 91 S. E. 846, and cases cite
11Talor v. Shufford (1825) 11 N. C. 116 t 15 Am. D. 512. The statement that estoppel operates only
as to facis seems to have in mind Coke's description (Co. Litt. 352a) that "estoppel closeth a man's mouth
to allege the truth" (the fact). As applied to the conventional effect of particular clauses and words in
deeds this is not unfair. The old estoppel at law was based on the presence of certain words or clauses;
if they were not present in just the reguired form, equivalent expressions would not work estoppel. See
judgment of .essel,
. R., in General Finance, etc. Co. v. Bldo. Soc. (1878) 10 Ch. Div. 15. This estoppel
has nothing but the name in common with modern estoppeI as stated in Van Rensselaer v. Kearney (tU. S.
1850) 11 How. 297, 13 L. Ed. 703, the principles of which are adopted by the North Carolina courts in
several cases. Baker v. Austn (1917) 174 N. C. 433, 93 S E. 949; Olds v. Cedar Works (1917) 173
N. C. 161, 165-6. 91 S. E. 846. See note 59.
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3. Rebutter, since its affects the estate itself, is a bar as to the estate in favor of the
whole world; estoppel bars only parties and privies
In a word, rebutter operates in rent,
estoppel in personain. But it should be noted that estoppel arising from leases by indenture
has the effect of common law rebutter and is a 'bar in favor of the whole world ;"swhile under
the modern American doctrine estoppel bars everyone
4. Rebutter was an incident of warranty only when the warranty was annexed to "tortious
conveyances" which operated through, or at least presupposed, actual livery of seizin." In
the common law conveyances which operated without livery and in "rightful conveyances"
under the statute of uses, a warranty would only act as estoppel, not as rebutter.n
5. Rebutter arose only when an estate passed by the livery out of which the warranty, with
its rebutter, grew, and ceased with the estate to which it was annexed. Estoppel, since it
arose out of the contract, may exist when nothing passes by the deed, if the parties so intended and expressed themselves. But no estoppel can grow out of a deed which is void
by law n
6. Rebutter operates only when the estate to be barred has been "put to a right" before
or at the time of the warranty made?'

If the above summary of the origin and characteristics of rebutter is correct,
it is obvious that under the present state of the law there cannot exist in North
Carolina any such thing as "rebutter by warranty," in the sense in which that expression is used at common law. For Qur deeds are deeds of bargain and sale, to
whose clauses of warranty the quality of technical rebutter does not attach. If
such deeds are said to "rebut or estop," rebutter is evidently used in a general
sense as a synonym for estoppel.
But technical rebutter might exist by virtue of some statute, and it has been
suggested or assumed in Olds v. Cedar Works, 25 that such a provision is found in
the statute of 1715 (C. S. sec. 3308), which enacts that registered deeds are "valid
and pass title and estate without livery of seizin." The statute, in terms at least,
does not give to registered deeds the effect of conveyances with livery, but on
the contrary enacts that registered deeds without livery shall pass title. It is,
however, settled law in North Carolina that by the statute all registered deeds
"are put on the same footing with feoffments at common law, with respect to

T Taylor v. Shufford, supra, note 15; Doe v. Oliver (1829) 10 B. & C. 181, 2 Smith, Leading Cases,
7th Am. ed., 605.
33 Like 6ther estoppels, estoppels in leases arose out of the contract, Butler's note no. 328 to Co. Litt.;
but carried after acquired title like rebutter. Co. Litt. 47b; Williams, Real Property, 17th ed., 504; Bigelow, Estoppel, 6th ed., 425, 426. Trevian v. Lawrence (1705) 1 Salk. 276, Smith, Leading Cases, 7th
Am. ed.. 580.
10See infra, note 58.
2)Taylor v. Shufford (1825) 11 N. C. 116, 129, 15 Am. D. 512. See Gilliam v. Jacocks (1826) 11
N. C. 310. Spruill v. Leary (1852) 35 N. C. 408, 418. This is settled doctrine in England. 2 Tiffany,
Real Property, 2nd ed., 2117, and authorities cited.
25See Rawle, Covenants, 3rd ed., 408; 2 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., 2118. Gilliam v. Jacocks
(1826) 11 N. C. 310.
2 Sheppard's Touchstone, Preston's ed., 186(3)- Co. Litt 378; Seymour's Case (1612) 10 Coke 95b;
Taylor v. Shufford (1825) 11 N. C. 116, 15 Am. b. 512. Gilliam v. Jacock (1826) 11
. C. 310, 333;
Lewis v. Cook (1851) 35 N. C. 193; Register v. Rowell (1856) 48 N. C. 312.
2 Smith v. Ingrai (1903) 132 N. C. 959, 44 S. E. 643, S. C. (1902) 130 N. C. 100, 40 S. E. 984,
married woman's deed without privy examination; Drake v. Howell (1903) 133 N. C. 163, deed not delivered; Wallin v. Rice (1915) 170 N. C. 417, 87 S. E. 239, deed without wife's privy examination.
21Sheppard's Touchstone, Preston's ed. 187(7); Co. Litt. 388b. Sey,nour's Case (1612) 10 Coke 95b, 3rd
Resolution: "It is a maxim in law that no warranty shall extend to bar any estate of freehold or inheritance which is in esse in possession, reversion, or remainder, and not displaced and put to a right before
or at the time of the warranty made;" quoted in Spruill v. Leary (1852) 35 N. C. 408, 414.
i (1917) 173 N. C. 161, 166, 91 S. E. 846.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
seizin, the declaration of uses thereon, and the consideration. ' 20 That is, because
the statute has abolished livery, all registered deeds operate as if they were given
with liveryv. In the earlier cases, where rebutter is so carefully discussed, there
is no hint or suggestion that its existence is in any way affected by the statute of
1715. The illogical and, I venture to think, regrettable doctrine of the later cases
should not be so extended as to give to an innocent conveyance with a covenant of
warranty, the tortious operation of common law livery with warranty. Certainly
this should not be done with the idea that effect is thereby given to a statute which
simply abolishes all livery.
In Olds v. Cedar Works, 27 it is said: "the distinction between an estoppel and

a rebutter, while questioned in some jurisdictions, has been recognized and established with us." It is submitted, however, that while the distinction is well established, there is, with one exception presently to be noticed, no case in our reports,
not overruled, which has ever recognized common law rebutters as a valid and
subsisting quality of any species of a deed in North Carolina.28 In several cases
it is said that after-acquired title inures by "estoppel or rebutter," without distinguishing their effects.2 9

The important North Carolina cases which have considered the distinction
will now be noticed.
Taylor v. Shufford.s0 Ejectment. The plaintiff claimed title under a grant
from the British crown in 1768, the defendant under a state grant of 1801.

The

plaintiff contended that, the state having succeeded to the position of the crown
upon our separation from England, the title of defendant under the grant of 1801

would inure to the plaintiff under his prior grant. The defendant had several
defenses to meet various contingencies: (1) the grant of 1768 was void, and
therefore could not be the foundation of any right, nor could it be a bar; (2) if
the grant of 1768 was held valid, there was no estoppel, because the state was not

bound by estoppel; (3) if the first two positions were held against him, there
could be no estoppel here, for the grant was without warranty, and estoppel de-

pended on warranty. The court held with the defendant on the first and second
defenses. Therefore, the holding as to the third defense was utterly immaterial.
But Judge Badger, the defendant's counsel, having rashly argued for the heresy
2aBryan v. Eason (1908) 147 N. C. 284, and cases cited at pp. 291-2, 61 S. E. 71; Jones v. Jones
(1913) 164 N. C. 320, 80 S. E. 430. It is interesting to note that this anomalous doctrine finds no support
in any case earlier than Love v. Harbin (1882) 87 N..C. 249 and was announced over the dissent of the
very able Judge Ashe. The earlier cases cited in Love v. jarbin will all be found consistent with the
decision in Hogan v. Strayhorn (1871) 65 N. C. 279 (miscited in Love v. Harbin, see Roiqland v. Rowland
(1885) 93 N. C. 214) either in principles stated or in the actual point decided.
The effect of this construction of the statute is, apparently, to do away with the doctrine of resulting
trusts arising from the fact of no consideration, as it does away with the theory of a use upan a use
(Rowland v. Rowland (1885) 93 N. C. 214), to nullify the statute of uses (C. S. sec. 1740), and the whole
theory of modern conveyancing. It would seem that when we adopted the statute of uses, we intended to
adopt the highly artificial, but thoroughly consistent system of conveyanclng which had grown out of that
statute. To take parts of that system and reject other parts would lead to anarchy. The effect of the
statute as explained in Hogan v. Strayhorn (1871) 65 N. C. 279, is thoroughly satisfactory, and leaves
the system of conveyancing established by the statute of uses untouched.
27 (1917)
173 N. C. 161. 91 S. E. 846.
2 See infra, Southerland v. Stout (1873) 68 N. C. 446, at note 43.
- Hauser v. Crafts (1904) 134 N. C. 319 46 S. E. 756; Buchanan v. Harr ngton (1906) 141 N. C.
39, 53 S. E. 478; Cooley v. Lee (1915) 170 . C. 18, 86 S. E. 720. James v. Hooker (1916) 172 N. C.
780, 783, 90 S. E. 925.
So (1825)
11 N. C. 127. 15 Am. D. 512.
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involved in the third defense, Judge Henderson, with his profound knowledge of
common law, improved the occasion by a masterly analysis of the difference between rebutter and estoppel. He did not assert, however, that rebutter existed
here, and for its value in connection with any point involved in the decision, the
opinion might as well have been a "reading" in the Inns of Court in the time of
Lord Coke. The actual holding was against rebutter.
Gilliam v. Jacocks.31 Ejectment. Gilliam, plaintiff, deduced title from a
deed of bargain and sale with full warranty given for value in 1748 by a tenant
in tail general in possession. Jacock, the defendant, claimed as heir under the
entail. The statute of limitation was held inapplicable, and as the deed long antedated the act destroying entails (now C. S. sec. 1734) the question was whetler
a bargain and sale with warranty barred the heir. Held, the defendant was not
barred by the deed. Taylor, C. J., placed the holding on the difference between a
real and a personal covenant. He declared that warranty in a bargain and sale
deed was a mere personal covenant, and was not a rebutter,3 2 but thought it might
be a discontinuance.3 3 Henderson, J., showed with great learning that a bargain
and sale, even with warranty, was no discontinuance of the entail, because a bargain
and sale, being innocent, only transferred the seizin which the grantor rightfully
had, i.e., the life estate of the grantor, the tenant in tail, and not the estate of the
heir in tail which had descended to him as heir to the original grantee in tail, and
was entirely independent of the bargain and sale. 34 Therefore, the bargain and
sale in no way affected the estate of the heir, whose estate was "not put to a right"
but "remained still in him."3 5 But Judge Henderson expressed no opinion as to
the ground upon which the Chief Justice had disposed of the case, viz., whether
the deed of 1748 contained "a pure warranty or only a covenant." The holding
of both judges was against the rebutter.
Flynn v. Willians.3 6 A father devised land to his son, A., with executory
devise over to his son, B., in case A. died without living issue. A., while in possession of his defeasible fee, bargained and sold the land with warranty to F. Afterwards B. died, leaving A. his sole heir, and finally A. died without issue. Held,
that A.'s heirs at law were rebutted by the warranty in the deed to F., whether
it were "lineal or collateral," which descended to them, and that as they were rebutted, it was unnecessary to decide whether they were estopped. After some
confusion, the decision has been rested on the ground that the death of B., which
took place before the condition happened that was to vest the devise over in him,
extinguished the condition and the land vested in A. absolutely, and he and his
heirs were barred: "First, [on the theory of estoppel] they were estopped by his
deed from claiming as his heirs; second [on .thetheory of rebutter] the warranty
- (1826) 11 N. C. 310.
nSee supra, note 8.
- See Butler's note 284 to Co. Litt, in fine, referring to the passage of Gilbert'd Tenures, 120, disapproved by Judge Henderson in our case at p. 334.
u "Under the statute de donis, descent is traced from the original donee, the issue in tail taking as
heir to him per forman doni and not as heir to the last actual tenant in tail." Challis, Real Property, 3rd
ed., 244. See 1 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., 73.
0 See .upra, note 24.
s (1841) 23 N. C. 509.
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was lineal and they could not claim the land as derived by descent from him in
opposition to his warranty."37 It was afterwards established that collateral warranty, mentioned by the court, upon the existence of which the case was thought
by very eminent judges to turn, is entirely abolished in this state.38 As is apparent
from the facts and from this quotation, the case is easily referable to simple estoppel, which is stated as an alternative ground of decision.
Spruill v. Leary.3 9 The question was: whether a bargain and sale deed with
full warranty given by one seized of a fee defeasible upon his death without living
children, barred the executory devise over, the bargainor having died without children after making the deed. The case was wrongly decided at first, 40 against the
dissent of Pearson, J.,41 whose opinion was afterwards and in the same year recognized as a correct exposition of the law. And it has been settled ever since that
such a deed is no bar. 4 2 Judge Pearson's opinion is a learned and detailed examination of warranty and rebutter, but since his conclusion is against rebutter in
this case it will be unnecessary to follow his argument in detail.
Southerland v. Stout.43 Ejectment. Plaintiff claimed by a chain of bargain
and sale deeds with general warranty as follows:
Cox to Potter, Potter to

McQueen, McQueen to plaintiff. The last deed was dated 11 years before the
trial.

Defendant claimed as daughter and heir at law of Potter. Cox, plaintiff's

original grantor, conveyed only a life estate, though seized in fee, but the subsequent deeds purported to be in fee.

Defendant was claiming against a grantee

of her father and against his deed, on the strength of an outstanding title in the
heirs of Cox, with which she did not connect herself. Apparently the case might
have been satisfactorily disposed of on the ground that defendant, claiming under

a common grantor with plaintiff, could not in ejectment defend on the ground of
an outstanding title without connecting herself with it; or, as the court hints, on

the issue of estoppel pure and simple, for the defendant stands in her father's
shoes and is bound by his assumption of title in himself. But the court preferred to

put its decision on the common law ground of rebutter from warranty, and learnedly traced the history of rebutter from the statutes of Gloucester (A. D. 1278) to
date; found that none of the various statutes covered this case, and held therefore

that defendant was rebutted by the warranty. Of this decision it may be remarked
that it is the first judicial recognition ever given by our courts of the old feudal
37Spruill v. Leary (1852) 35 N. C. 416, 417. And see Meyers v. Craig (1852) 44 N. C. 169.
"I See the cases last cited, and C. S. sec. 1741.
P5 (1852) 35 N. C. 225, 408.
40(1852) 35 N. C. 225.
The court thought the case ruled by the statute of 4 and', s Anne (1705)
oh. 16, sec. 21, which, after being reported as in force in North Carolina in 1792, (see Potter's Re. (1821)
p. 921 had been adopted in this state, Rev. Stat. (1837) ch. 43, sec. 8. The statute abolished collateral
warranties except those made by an ancestor having an estate of inheritance in possession in the land.
The court thought the warranty here was within the exception and therefore not abolished by the statute.
Pearson, J., showed that the statute was passed to restrain warranties and that the exception had reference
to estates tail only, which of course had been abolished in Norh Carolina. The statute, its phraseology
changed to conform with the ideas here expressed, is now C. S. sec. 1740. See Southcrland v. Stout, infra,
note 43.
-1 (1852) 35 N. C. 408.
Mey rs v. Craig (1852) 44 N. C. 169. This is an affirmance of the elementary rule that, with the
exception' of executory interests after estates tail, which were barrable by common recovery' suffered by
tenants in tail an executory interest can not be affected by any act of the holder of the prior estate out
of which or ater which it is limited. 1 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., 568. Southerla:d v. Cox (1832)
14 N. C. 394, 397. Pearson, J., points this out in his opinion. 35 N. C. 408, 415, et seq.
'a (1873)
68 N. C. 446.

ESTOPPEL AND REBUTTER IN NORTH CAROLINA
law of warranty as modern subsisting law (and probably the last in the English
speaking world) ; that logically it requires the recognition of the tortious effect of
the conveyance on which warranty and therefore the rebutter is founded ;44 that
it gives this effect to warranty in a bargain and sale, contrary to the authorities
here and elsewhere ;45 and finally that it was entirely unnecessary.
Bell v. Adamfls. 46 Full warranty deed undertaking to convey an absolute estate in a certain lot, transfers the grantor's interest and "has the effect by way of
rebutter of passing against his heirs, parties to the action" the interest of another
devisee subsequently inherited by the grantor, and the whole title thus acquired
by the grantor vests in the defendant, a purchaser from him. Though the court
speaks of "rebutter," the controversy between the parties makes it a case of
47

estoppel only.

Fosterv. Hackett.4 8 Land was devised to several children, the share of any
such child dying without issue to go to the survivors. One of the children after
the testator's death conveyed his share by bargain and sale with warranty. The
deed passed not only the share to which the maker was entitled at the time of
making the deed, but also accessions to his share subsequently acquired by the
death of other children witho'ut heirs. The court said: "The deed estops him, or
the warranty his heirs."149 It is settled now that such a deed even without warranty binds the after-acquired interest, if capable of transfer. 50
Weeks v. Wilkins.51 In 1863, plaintiff, living with his six brothers and sisters,
conveyed the land in controversy in fee for value by joint and several bargain
and sale deed with joint and several covenants of warranty to defendant's predecessor in title. Three of the sisters, married women, executed the deed without
privy examination. In 1899, the other grantors in the deed of 1863, including the
married sisters, conveyed their shares to plaintiff by deed properly executed.
Held, the plaintiff was estopped by the deed of 1863, which he executed as a
several grantor with several warranty, to set up title acquired under the deed of
1899, against defendant, claiming under the grantee of the deed of 1863. A title
acquired by the grantor after his deed inures as against him, to his grantee and
to those claiming under the grantee. The holding is based on estoppel and to
show that it is so the distinction between the warranty and estoppel is quoted
52

from Taylor v. Shufford.

Olds v. Cedar Works.53 Ejectment. Plaintiff showed title from the state
by grant to &ewby; a deed dated 1815, from Newby to plaintiff's ancestor, and
44See supra, note 20.
See supra, note 21.
(1879) 81 N. C. 118.
'5This case is cited in Olds v. Cedar Works (1917)
distinction between rebutter and estopel..
' (1893) 112 N. C. 546, 17 S. E. 426.
12(1893) 112 N. C. 546, at p. 557, 17 S. E. 426.
&.Hobgood v. Hobgood
C. 659, 50 S. E. 315.

$1(1905)

02 (1825)

(1917)

(1915)

169 N. C. 485, 489-90, 86 S. E.

139 N. C. 215, 51 S. E. 909.
11 N.

173 N. C. 161, 91 S. E. 846, as approving the

C. 116, 15 Am. D.

512.

173 N. C. 161, 91 S. E. 846.

189; Kornegay v. Miller (1905)

See s. c. (1904) 134 N. C. 516, 47 S. E. 24,
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regular chain of title since. Defendant showed deed with warranty dated 1812,
from Newby, plaintiff's ancestor, to W., made before Newby had any title; and
contended that by virtue of the warranty in the deed of 1812, Newby and his
heirs were estopped to claim the title subsequently acquired in 1815, which "fed
the estoppel" and inured to the grantee in the first deed. The court says, moreover that "the defendant is neither a party nor a privy to the deed of 1812." Held,
the plaintiff was "estopped or rebutted" because in ejectment the plaintiff must
prove title in himself, and here "in one case [rebutter] there is no right of action
and in the other [estoppel] there is no title in the plaintiff as it has vested in the
grantee in the deed with warranty." The case does not mention the registry of
either deed and does not consider priority of registry, or the principle that a bona
fide purchaser without notice takes free from rights or equities accruing under
deeds made before the grantor had title.5 4 Moreover, in announcing the reason
for the holding, the court apparently overlooked the principle that when both
parties claim under a common source, the defendant cannot defeat recovery upon
the ground of an outstanding title unless he connects himself with it."
But as to the distinction between rebutter and estoppel, it is submitted that
while the contrast is emphasized in words, no difference of any practical value is
left. The after-acquired title is held to inure against the grantor, whether the
principle upon which it is available is called "estoppel" or "rebutter," and in either
case it is available to one without privity with the deed from which the estoppel
grows-that is, it is available to any one as against the grantor and his heirs.
Since in each case it has the same effect, ,what does it matter what the principle is
named? The suggested distinction, that when the question is whether, under a
particular clause in a deed, an after-acquired title actually passes, it is to be
called "estoppel," but when the question is whether the same clause in the same
deed bars the grantor's heirs it is "rebutter" only gives different names to the
shield as viewed from different sides. Besides, such a distinction turns topsyturvy the real difference as set out in our earlier cases and in all the books; namely,
that rebutter by warranty does actually transfer the after-acquired title as against
the grantor in favor of the whole world, while estoppel merely operates to transfer the title as to parties and privies.5" The position is not improved by construing the statute abolishing livery so as to make all registered deeds take effect
as feoffments, that is, by livery.57
The only satisfactory ground for the decision is that the American courts,
owing to historical reasons, have been compelled to give to "estoppel," even in
innocent conveyances, the effect on after-acquired title of common law rebutter
in tortious conveyances. This broad meaning of estoppel in modern American
law 58 is assumed as an alternative ground of decision in Olds v. Cedar Works, is
"See infra, note 64.
Bonds v. Smith (1890) 106 N. c. 53, 565 11 S. E. 32 and numerous cases before and snce.
Sedgwick and Wait, Trial of Title to Land, 2nd ed., sec. 803; 7 A. L. R. 860, note.
"See supra, note 17.
STSee supra, note 26.
.. See Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., 2119, and note 6; Ayer v. Philadelphia Brick Co. (1893) 159
Mfass. 84, 34 N. *. 177.
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recognized in several North Carolina cases, 59 and is in thorough harmony with
our theory of construing deeds not by separating them into their technical common law parts, each with its own artificial weight, but by construing them as
entireties evidencing the intention of the parties by everything "within the four
corners" of the instrument.6 0
It thus appears that in English law all warranties were abolished ninety years
ago and with them rebutter in a technical sense; that in American law by the entire disuse of feoffments and of real actions, and by the universal use of innocent
conveyances under the statute of uses as the common assurance of title, a similar
result has been accomplished; that though American conveyancers retained the
form of warranty, yet, attached to innocent conveyances, the warranty became a
mere personal covenant; and that the liberalizing tendencies of the time, throwing off outworn common law distinctions, has led to the broadening of the meaning of estoppel so that it now supplies the place of common law rebutter. It is
submitted that our courts should discard in theory, as they have already done in
fact, the doctrine of rebutter by warranty, and dispose of cases frankly on the
score of estoppel.
One or two very interesting additional points should be glanced at. Which
of the two theories of estoppel stated toward the beginning of this paper do our
courts adopt-does after-acquired title pass as if conveyed by the instrument
creating the estoppel? Or is its transfer the result of equitable principles made
available in legal actions? A class of cases, which would seem crucial, exists
when a deed containing covenants of title is given and the vendor not having title
at the date of the deed subsequently acquires title. Is the vendee forced to accept this title in entire or partial satisfaction of the covenant, or may he elect to
stand on the breach and recover substantial damages?"' Our courts have adopted
the view that the grantee can be compelled to accept the after-acquired title in
satisfaction, 2 that is, the effect of estoppel seems to be just as if the title had been
conveyed in the original deed. But in recognizing a right of action for nominal
damages, the subsequent acquisition is differentiated from a title passing at the
date of the deed. On the other hand, if estoppel is based on a recognition in
courts of law of the purchaser's equitable, right to have the after-acquired title
conveyed to him, it would be subject to the equitable defense of purchaser for
value without notice. Suppose two grantees from the same grantor, each deed
capable of carrying after-acquired title by estoppel, and that after the first grant
V Hallburton v. Slagle (1903) 132 N. C. 947, 950, 44 S. E. 655; Weeks v. Wilkins (1905) 139 N. C.
215 218 51S. E. 909. See Bensck v. Bowman (1857) 56 N. C. 314; Eddleman v. Carpenter (1860) 52
N. C. 66 (cited 173 N. C. 165); 2 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., 2118. That after-acquired title may
inure without warranty, appears from the cases where it, inures under a covenant of seizin (note 62,
infra) and cases deciding that "when the holders of a contingent estate are specified and known, they may
assign and convey it, and in the absence of fraud or imposition, when such a deed is made, it will conclude all who must claim under the grantors, even though the conveyance is without warranty or any
valuable consideration moving between the parties." Hobgood v. Hobgood (1915) 169 N. C. 485, 489-90,
86 S. E. 189.
es Triplett v. Williams (1908) 149 N. C. 394, 63 S. E. 79, the leading case in North Carolina.
e1See 2 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., 2119. A good statement of the alternative is given in
Resser v. Carney (1893) 52 Minn. 397, 54 N. W. 89.
?Meyer v. Thompson (1922)- 183 N. C. 543, 112 S. E. 328, citing earlier cases. The subsequently
acquired title "inures to the grantee by estoppel" although the covenant sued on is for seizin (Bank v.
Glenn (1873) 68 N. C. 35), a personal covenant which does not run with the land.

